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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : Case No. 
vs. : 
KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Appellant : 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in finding 
that certain property became marital property because it was 
purchased during the marriage regardless of the source of 
funds used to acquire the asset? 
2. Did the trial court apportion property in a 
manifestly unjust or inequitable fashion so as to amount to 
a clear abuse of discretion? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Opinion") appears under case number 
870579-CA and was labeled "Not for Publication." The 
Opinion is set forth in the Appendix to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on 
March 31, 1989. It then entered an Order Denying Mr. 
Phillips' Petition for Rehearing on June 16, 1989. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
§78-2-2(5), Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1988), pursuant 
to the rule making power conferred upon it by §78-2-4, Utah 
Code Annotated (as amended 1986), and through Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, Rule 4 3, subsections (2) , ( 3 ) and (4) . 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1985), 
(Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction) 
30-3-5(1) When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the 
children, property and parties... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is a divorce 
proceeding; trial was held before the Honorable David E. 
Roth in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on November 18, 1987 
(See Appendix C) . Mrs. Phillips appealed that decision to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, which (1) modified the property 
division and (2) remanded the case for further findings of 
fact concerning the alimony award. This Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari challenges only the property division. 
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2. Disposition at Trial Court. The trial court 
found that the assets of Phillips Investments, which 
totalled $260,000, were the separate property of Mr. 
Phillips and not part of the marital estate (R. p.202, 
para.11). The court found that the marital estate had 
assets totalling $140,876 (R. p.203, para.12) and awarded 
Mr. Phillips assets totalling $70,052 and Mrs. Phillips 
assets totaling $70,824. (Note - although Mr. Phillips 
received assets valued at $94,052 and Mrs. Phillips received 
assets valued at $46,824, this was equalized by Mr. Phillips 
paying to Mrs. Phillips the sum of $24,000 (R. pp.206 & 207, 
para.11, 12 & 13). 
3. Disposition at Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals found that the half of Phillips Investments that 
Scott Phillips received when his brother died was received 
as the result of a Buy-Sell Agreement between the two 
brothers. The Court said this turned half of Phillips 
Investments into property which was acquired as a result of 
a purchase during the marriage and was therefore marital, 
not separate property. It awarded Mrs. Phillips 50% of this 
half of Phillips Investments, for a total additional prop-
erty award to her of $70,000 (Opinion, pp.5&6). 
5. Relevant Facts. In addition to the marital 
estate assets of $140,876, there were also approximately 
$260,000 worth of assets in Phillips Investments. The 
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Phillips Investments business entity was created by Mr. 
Phillip's parents through their operation of a funeral 
home business in Idaho from 1937 to 1979 (Tr. p.11). In 
19 66, it became known as White Mortuary, Inc., with Mr. 
Phillips and his parents being listed as initial incorpora-
tors (R. Exhibit #12). Mr. Phillips and his parents each 
received one share of stock in the corporation, but Mr. 
Phillips was not involved in the operation of the business 
(Tr. p.14). 
In the 1970s, Mr. Phillip's parents began a yearly 
gift giving program in order to gradually transfer ownership 
of the business to their two sons with a minimum of estate 
tax consequences (Tr. pp.15, 39). In 1979, the parents sold 
the mortuary business to a Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Holman, and 
in 1982, the two sons purchased the balance of their 
parents1 ownership in the business by signing a promissory 
note (Tr. p.17, 18). The payments on the promissory note to 
Mr. Phillip's parents were made out of the yearly payments 
received from Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Holman (Tr. p.18). 
In 198 3, the Phillips Investments entity was con-
verted from a corporation to a partnership (Tr. p. 20). In 
that same year, Mr. Phillips and his brother Mark signed a 
Buy-Sell Agreement indicating that if either died, the other 
would become sole owner of the assets (R. Exhibit #5). At 
the same time, the wives of Mr. Phillips and his brother 
-4-
signed Joinder of Spouse documents (R. Exhibit #17 and see 
Appendix D to this brief), indicating they made no claim to 
the assets of Phillips Investments and recognizing it was 
the separate property of their husbands. 
Phillips Investments then purchased life insurance 
policies on both brothers in order to fund the Buy-Sell 
Agreement. The premiums for the insurance policies were 
paid from yearly gifts of cash made to the brothers by their 
parents (See Appendix E). In 1984, Mr. Phillips1 brother 
died and Mr. Phillips became the sole owner of the assets. 
In 19 85, Mr. Phillips created the Phillips Investments 
Trust and placed into it all of the assets which had been 
part of the Phillips Investments business entity (Tr. p.7, 
lines 1-5). 
Whatever the legal form of the Phillips! family 
business over the years, neither Mr. Phillips nor Mrs. 
Phillips were actively involved in the operation of the 
business. Mrs. Phillips was never involved in any part of 
the business or the management of assets (Tr. p.140, lines 
10-19). Neither party ever added any of their own monies to 
the assets of Phillips Investments (Tr. p.65, lines 2-5; 
p.140, lines 20-23). Mr. Phillips' own involvement was very 
minimal and was limited to signing various documents his 
family advised him to sign (Tr. p. 14, lines 9-11; p. 16, 
lines 4-6; p.17, lines 22-25; p.24, lines 8-22; p.41, lines 
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21-25; p.42, line 1; p.64, lines 1-5). Mr. Phillips1 par-
ents testified that they still kept the books and records 
for Phillips Investments (Tr. p. 23, lines 9 & 10; p. 45, 
lines 7-9) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals1 decision, in ruling that 
because Scott Phillips acquired one-half of Phillips 
Investments through a Buy-Sell Agreement it was a purchase 
made during the marriage and therefore a marital asset, is a 
dramatic departure from precedents established by this 
Court. The Opinion ignores the fact that the Buy-Sell 
Agreement was funded by an insurance policy which was paid 
for with gifted funds. The Opinion established a new prece-
dent in Utah that when separate property is used to purchase 
a new asset, that new asset is thereby transformed into mar-
ital property. (It is interesting to note that despite this 
significant new rule of law, the Court of Appeals designated 
the Phillips' Opinion as "Not for Publication.11) Because 
the Court of Appealsf Opinion is in conflict with prior 
decisions of this Court, this Court should exercise its 
power of review. If the Court of Appeals is correct in its 
ruling that the type of transaction involved in Phillips 
transforms separate property to marital property, this is an 
important and new question of law which should be settled by 
this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS 
WHEN IT STATED THAT MR. PHILLIPS PAID THE 
INSURANCE PREMIUMS ON HIS BROTHER'S LIFE 
INSURANCE POLICY. 
The Court of Appeals refers several times in its 
Opinion to the "fact" that Mr. Phillips himself furnished 
the consideration to pay for the insurance policy on Mark 
Phillips1 life. At the bottom of Page 3, the court states 
"...consideration for the insurance policy was paid by Mr. 
Phillips himself, not by a donor." At the top of Page 4 of 
the Opinion, the court states that "Mr. Phillips did not 
show it (the interest he acquired from his brother) .. .was 
acquired...with gifted or inherited funds." At the top of 
Page 5, the court states "(t)he fact that Mr. Phillips util-
ized insurance proceeds from a policy he purchased..." 
Again, at the bottom of Page 5, the court states that the 
share of Phillips Investments that Mr. Phillips received on 
the death of his brother "...was not purchased with funds 
that were gifted to him by a donor." 
These statements by the Court of Appeals are abso-
lutely incorrect. Nowhere in the trial of this action did 
Mr. Phillips or anyone else testify that he paid for the 
insurance premiums out of his own assets. 
All references to payment of insurance premiums in 
the trial transcript show that Mr. Phillips' parents, Hugh 
and Frances Phillips, were making yearly gifts to their two 
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sons (Scott and Mark) to allow them to pay the premiums on 
the life insurance policies. A summary of those references 
from the trial transcripts is attached as Exhibit E in the 
Appendix to this brief. 
If the Court of Appeals thought there was any 
confusion on the issue of whether or not Scott Phillips paid 
any of the insurance premiums from his marital property, it 
should have remanded the case to the trial court for further 
testimony. Mr. Phillips' parents could certainly produce 
evidence of each of the yearly checks that they gave to 
Scott and Mark as gifts in order to pay the insurance 
premiums, together with the checks that were then written by 
Mark to the insurance company to pay the premiums. There is 
not one reference in the trial transcript to Scott Phillips 
ever having personally made any payments of insurance 
premiums. While the parties' Buy-Sell Agreement, introduced 
as Exhibit 5 at the trial, does contain language that sounds 
as if Mr. Phillips was personally purchasing the insurance 
policies, this is not what in fact happened. This Court 
should look at the manner in which the parties actually con-
ducted their business to determine whether or not an asset 
is separate or marital property. Because Mr. Phillips1 mar-
ital property was in no way involved with the funding of 
this Buy-Sell Agreement, the proceeds of the funding should 
remain separate property. 
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It should also be noted that Mrs. Phillips makes 
much of the fact that the parties lived in a Jackson, 
Wyoming home from 1970 to 1979 which was owned by Phillips 
Investments. When Phillips Investments sold the house, it 
made a profit of approximately $55,000 (Tr. p.48). Mrs. 
Phillips argues that this shows that part of Phillips 
Investments should have been a marital asset. However, in 
making this argument, she ignores the fact that the parties 
only had to pay rent of $150 per month for a home which had 
a fair rental value of $750 per month at the time they moved 
out (Tr. p.131, lines 23-25, p.132, lines 1-14). The fact 
that the parties were able to live for such a long period of 
time with a minimal rent payment most certainly allowed them 
to build their financial strength, such that they were able 
to acquire a marital estate worth some $140,000. The fact 
that Phillips Investments made a profit from the sale of the 
home is not cause to bring the proceeds into the marital 
estate. 
POINT TWO: BECAUSE ALL INSURANCE PREMIUMS WERE PAID WITH 
GIFTED FUNDS, THE PROCEEDS OF THE INVESTMENT 
REMAIN SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion states that Mr. 
Phillips acquired his brother's Phillips Investments stock 
during marriage by purchase and it is therefore marital 
property (p.5). The court also noted, in Footnote 4, that 
even if it believed Mr. Phillips had paid the insurance pre-
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miums with gifted funds, he might have recovered the 
premiums, but the proceeds of the insurance policy would 
still be deemed marital property. 
In ruling that because an asset was acquired during 
marriage by purchase, it becomes marital property, the court 
greatly deviated from the principles enunciated by this 
Court for determining whether an asset is separate property 
or marital property. In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304 (Utah 1988), the Court stated that trial courts making 
equitable property distributions should 
...generally award property acquired by 
one spouse by gift and inheritance during 
the marriage (or property acquired in 
exchange thereof) to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or 
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the 
other spouse has by his or her efforts or 
expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that 
property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, ... or (2) the property 
has been consumed or its identity lost 
through co-mingling or exchanges or where 
the acquiring spouse has made a gift of 
an interest therein to the other spouse. 
760 P.2d at 308. 
The Phillips1 Opinion dismisses the fact that nei-
ther party contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or 
protection of the property. It also dismisses the fact that 
the property completely retained its separate identity and 
that it was not co-mingled with the Phillips1 marital 
property. (The few assets obtained from Phillips Investment 
money, such as Mr. Phillips1 car and part of the IRAs, were, 
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at the suggestion of Mr. Phillips, treated as marital 
property. See Tr. p.67, lines 2-6; Tr. p.68, lines 10-25, 
Tr. p.69, lines 1-11.) The court dismissed all of these 
factors as insignificant in view of the fact that Mr. 
Phillips "purchased" his brother's interest in Phillips 
Investments during marriage. 
Since the Court of Appeals seems to be unconcerned 
with the source of funds used by Mr. Phillips to make this 
purchase, the logical extension of its ruling is that any 
party who sells separate property during marriage thereby 
loses the separate status of that asset. If stocks are sold 
to buy bonds, the bonds become marital property. If real 
estate is sold to buy gold coins, the coins become marital 
property. If an insurance policy is sold for its cash sur-
render value, and the money is used to purchase a certifi-
cate of deposit, the certificate of deposit becomes marital 
property. This method of analyzing separate property cre-
ates an exception so large that it swallows the principles 
set forth in Mortensen. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Mortensen commented on 
the purpose for its ruling: 
These rules will preserve and give effect 
to the right that married persons have 
always had in this state to separately 
own and enjoy property. It also accords 
with the normal intent of donors or 
deceased persons that their gifts and 
inheritances should be kept within their 
family and succession should not be 
diverted because of divorce. 760 P. 2d at 
308 Sc 309. 
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Clearly, Mr. Phillips1 parents, Hugh and Frances, who 
engaged in a painstakingly crafted gift giving program over 
a period of years (Tr. pp.39 & 40) and who gifted cash to 
their sons on a yearly basis in order to purchase the insur-
ance policies used to secure the Buy-Sell Agreement, are 
exactly the type of persons to whom this Court referred when 
it discussed donors who intended to keep their gifts in the 
family. 
The Court of Appeals cited Giedinghagen v. 
Giedinghagen, 712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), In Re 
Marriage of Agazim, 498 N.E.2d 742 (111. App. 1986), and 
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987), as 
cases that support its conclusion that any property acquired 
during marriage by purchase or winnings is marital property. 
However, careful analysis of these cases show that they are 
not good authority for a court applying the Utah equitable 
distribution statute (§30-3-5, U.C.A.). 
The court referred to Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 
supra, as authority for a wifefs lottery winnings being mar-
ital property. However, the Missouri court was interpreting 
a specific state statute as to whether property acquired 
after the filing of the divorce petition, but before the 
final divorce, was marital or separate property. The state 
statute, unlike Utah's, said that "all property acquired by 
either spouse is presumed to be marital property." (712 
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S.W.2d at 712). The court said that the wife's lottery 
winnings, won after the filing of the petition for 
dissolution, were marital property under the definition in 
the statute. However, the court then said 
We do not hold nor intimate that husband 
here is entitled to any portion of the 
proceeds of the lottery winnings. The 
court is to make a just distribution of 
the marital property and in doing so may 
take into account the contribution of 
each spouse to the acquisition of the 
property as well as other considerations. 
(712 S.W.2d at 714, emphasis in the 
original). 
A later case from that same court, citing 
Giedinghagen, noted the importance of looking at the "source 
of funds" rule for determining whether property is marital 
or separate. In Hill v. Hill, 747 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1988), the court stated that if separate property has been 
partly purchased through the use of marital funds, it would 
result in a percentage marital interest in a spouse's other-
wise separate property. "Incremental property values are 
allocated proportionately to either marital or separate 
estates according to the source of funds used to purchase 
the property." 747 S.W.2d at 719 
In the case of In re Marriage of Agazim, supra, the 
Illinois court was, again, interpreting a specific Illinois 
statute different from any in Utah. In that case, the court 
ruled that an interest a father gave to his daughter that 
included an obligation on the part of the daughter to pay 
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annual payments to the father was a purchase and not a gift 
for the purposes of property distribution. However, what 
the Utah Court of Appeals fails to note is that upon remand 
to the trial court for equitable distribution of assets the 
court awarded the entire interest to the wife because all of 
the payments made to her father were made with funds gener-
ated by the property, which neither spouse had to expend any 
effort to realize. In other words, the source of funds was 
considered. See In re Marriage of Agazim, 530 N.E.2d 110 
(111. App. 1988) . 
The Court of Appeals also cited the case of Wagner 
v. Wagner, supra, as authority for the proposition that a 
transaction that was a purchase during marriage made the 
asset marital property. In Wagner, the court found that a 
daughter!s signing of promissory notes to her father to 
acquire interest in a shopping center was a purchase, not a 
gift, even though the father later forgave repayment of the 
promissory notes as a program of gift giving to his 
children. The court said that because it was a purchase, it 
was marital property. 
This is different than the result reached in 
Wierman v. Wierman, 387 N.W.2d 744 (Wise. 1986). (Wierman 
is a case cited by the Utah Supreme Court in its Mortensen 
decision as it reviewed case law from other states and, from 
that review, enunciated the principle to be followed in 
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Utah. See 760 P.2d at 307.) In Wierman, the father had 
transferred his interest in a real estate venture to his 
daughter. The transfers were made over a period of years 
and were structured as part gift and part purchase, with the 
purchase price payable in installments. The father each 
year forgave the repayment of the daughter's promissory 
notes as a gift. The Wierman court, in direct contradiction 
to the Wagner court, found that the wife's interest in this 
real estate venture, acquired by her through a gift from her 
father, retained its character as separate property, despite 
the fact that purchase documents had been signed. The court 
also noted that despite a sale and exchange of assets, the 
increase in the value of the separate property was not 
attributable to either spouse, but was the result of a 
source independent of the marriage. Therefore, the asset 
should remain separate property. The logic followed by the 
Wisconsin court in Wierman is much more in line with the 
Utah principles explained in Mortensen for evaluating sepa-
rate and marital property than the logic followed by the 
Virginia court in Wagner. 
It is instructive to review three other cases that 
were cited in the Mortensen decision by this Court (760 P.2d 
at 307) as it reviewed case law from other states as suppor-
tive of the principles it established for evaluating sepa-
rate property. In the case of In re Marriage of Pitluck, 
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616 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), the court found that the 
cash value of life insurance policies attributable to premi-
ums paid by the husband fs father could be treated as gifts 
from the father to son and were therefore the sonfs separate 
property. The court acknowledged that a percentage of the 
value attributable to premiums paid by the son from marital 
funds could be considered marital property; however, there 
was insufficient evidence in this case on what that amount 
would be. Similarly, in Phillips, the value of the life 
insurance policy, which in this case had a death benefit 
value rather than a cash surrender value, should be Mr. 
Phillips1 separate property. See also Bailey v. Bailey, 
295 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 1982), (husband's mother had used pro-
ceeds of a life insurance policy on the husband's father to 
buy a home and gave the home to the husband; the court held 
the home was separate property); and Van Newkirk v. Van 
Newkirk, 325 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 1982), (the increase in the 
value of an asset, when that increase was not due to the 
efforts of either marital partner, should remain separate 
property). 
In Mortensen, this Court discussed three circum-
stances where there would be an exception to the rule that 
property acquired by gift should remain the separate prop-
erty of the donee spouse. On p.307, the Court lists the 
following three exceptions: 
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1. When the property thus acquired is 
consumed, such as when a gift or inheri-
tance of money is used for family 
purposes. 
2. When the property completely loses 
its identity and is not traceable because 
it is co-mingled with other property. 
3. When the acquiring spouse places 
title in joint names in such a manner as 
to evidence -an intent to make it marital 
property. 
Clearly, none of these circumstances were present in Mr. 
Phillips1 treatment of the assets of Phillips Investments. 
The trial court was correct when it examined the contribu-
tions that had been made by Mr. and Mrs. Phillips to the 
assets of Phillips Investments, and upon determining that 
neither party had made any contributions to the assets, that 
it should remain the separate property of Mr. Phillips. 
POINT THREE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN DIRECT 
CONTRADICTION TO RULINGS OF THIS COURT IN 
REVERSING A PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION THAT WAS NOT 
UNJUST NOR INEQUITABLE. 
The Court of Appeals is not permitted to reverse a 
trial court's property distribution unless the apportionment 
"works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate 
a clear abuse of discretion." Petersen v. Petersen, 737 
P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). This Court in the Mortensen 
decision reemphasized this fact: 
Significantly no case has been found 
where this court has reversed a trial 
court's disposition of gifts or inherited 
property received by one party during the 
marriage. In almost every case we have 
emphasized the wide discretion trial 
courts have in property division. 760 
P.2d at 307. 
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The trial court in this case was within its discre-
tion in finding that the assets of Phillips Investments were 
the separate property of Scott Phillips. In fact, the trial 
court considered Mr. Phillips1 income from the assets when 
determining the appropriate amount of child support and 
alimony. The fact that the Court of Appeals does not agree 
with the manner in which the trial court exercised its dis-
cretion does not give it the right to reverse that decision. 
This Court has also noted that sometimes the only 
equitable distribution of property involves awarding some of 
the gifted or inherited separate property to the non-donee 
spouse. This Court has stated that, "the overarching gen-
eral rule remains the same in any divorce case: to provide 
adequate support for the children of the marriage.11 Race v. 
Race, 740 P.2d 253 at 256 (Utah 1987), and, "to divide the 
economic assets and income stream of the parties so as to 
permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage." Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 at 1373 (Utah 
1988). In the case at hand, very little of the money from 
Phillips Investments was used to maintain a certain standard 
of living. Those assets which were purchased from Phillips 
Investments1 money and used by the parties were clearly 
labeled marital assets and divided as part of the marital 
estate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals, in labeling one-half of 
Phillips Investments marital property simply because it was 
acquired by "purchase" during the marriage, has issued a 
decision which conflicts with the principles set forth by 
this Court in Mortensen and its predecessors. The lower 
court has failed to look at the source of funds used to 
acquire the asset, and has ignored the fact that neither 
spouse contributed any effort or money to the value of the 
asset. Pursuant to Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, this Court should grant review by writ of 
certiorari. 
Furthermore, if there is to be a new rule in Utah 
which states that assets acquired by purchase during mar-
riage are to be labeled marital assets, it is a rule which 
should be explained and set forth by this Court. It would 
cause a major change in the way attorneys and clients would 
evaluate assets, both in terms of divorces and in terms of 
estate, gift and tax planning. Most likely, after full 
review, this Court would conclude that such a dramatic 
change in the law would have to come from the legislature, 
not the courts. It certainly is not a change in the law 
that should come from an unpublished opinion of a panel of 
the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Rule 43(4) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court, this Court should grant 
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certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J7 ^" day of July, 1989. 
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Attorneys: Robert L. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant 
Jane A. Marquardt, Ogden, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant, Kathryn Phillips, seeks reversal or adjustment 
of the property and alimony awarded to her upon divorce. We 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for 
further consideration. 
The precise property issue we must decide is whether 
property acquired during marriage through a buy-sell agreement 
of one spouse is the separate property of that spouse or 
marital property? 
The alimony issue is whether the findings support the 
alimony award as to amount and time limit. 
PROPERTY: SEPARATE OR MARITAL? 
The parties were married October 6, 1967. At the time of 
divorce, each was forty-five years of age and their two sons 
were nineteen and sixteen. Mrs. Phillips had one year of 
college and one and one-half years of medical technology 
training prior to marriage. She was a homemaker during the 
twenty-year marriage and was unemployed when divorced. Mr. 
Phillips was a career employee with the U.S. Forest Service. 
In January 1967, Scott Phillips' parents organized a 
business corporation which became known as Phillips Investment 
Corporation, Inc. During the 1970*s, his parents gifted to him 
and his brother, Mark, 24.5% each of the corporate stock. On 
January 1, 1980, the brothers entered into a "Buy-Sell Stock 
Agreement.M Therein each agreed to purchase the stock of the 
other in the event of death or a lifetime sale. The purchase 
price was to be determined on an annual basis by endorsing a 
stock value on a schedule. Each agreed to procure, as policy 
owner and beneficiary, life insurance on the life of the other 
in the amount specified in the schedule. Each was required to 
maintain the policy owned, "paying all premiums when due and 
delivering proof of such premium payment to the insured." If 
the premium was not paid, the other could advance payment and 
would be entitled to reimbursement with interest. Their 
agreement provided that upon death of a stockholder, "the 
surviving stockholder shall purchase all of the decedent's 
stock in the corporation." In the event the value of the stock 
exceeded the insurance proceeds, the balance of the purchase 
price could be paid by delivering a negotiable promissory note 
in that amount payable on terms specified. If life insurance 
coverage exceeded the stock value, "the excess of each policy 
shall be retained by the beneficiary thereof for his own 
benefit." 
In 1982, the brothers acquired the balance of the corporate 
stock from their parents and became equal owners. In 1983, the 
brothers converted the corporation into Phillips Investments, a 
general partnership. At that time, they requested each of 
their wives to sign a document labeled "Joinder of Spouse," and 
each wife obliged on May 12, 1983. That document stated that 
"the stock of [the corporation] was acquired by her husband 
prior to their marriage or by gift during marriage" and is his 
sole and separate property and that "all income and gains from 
such separate property shall be the sole and separate property 
of said husband." (Emphasis added.) 
In 1984, Mark Phillips died, and Scott Phillips purchased 
his brother's 50% share of Phillips Investments for $218,000 
funded by insurance proceeds. Thereafter, Mr. Phillips 
transferred the assets into Phillips Investment Trust. At time 
of trial, the trust was valued at $260,000. The lower court 
entered the following finding of fact: 
870579-CA 2 
Plaintiff is the owner of assets worth 
approximately $260,000.00 which are now in 
the entity known as Phillips Investment 
Trust. These assets were gifted to 
plaintiff by his parents over a period of 
many years. Neither plaintiff nor 
defendant have done any significant work 
in the business which made up Phillips 
Investments, nor have either of them made 
any contributions to the value of the 
assets in Phillips Investments. The 
assets of Phillips Investments are 
Plaintiffs' separate property and 
defendant has no claim to this property. 
The fact that plaintiff does have the 
resources of Phillips Investments 
available to him is relevant only to his 
ability to pay child support and alimony. 
The conclusions of law state: "The assets of Phillips 
Investment Trust are plaintiff's sole and separate property and 
defendant has no claim thereto." Mrs. Phillips contends that 
the one-half ownership of the partnership-trust acquired from 
Mark Phillips was not "by means of inheritance or gift but as 
the result of a business transaction." Thus, she argues, this 
particular 50% ownership share is marital property, not Mr. 
Phillips' separate property. Mr. Phillips argues in support of 
the above findings. He also argues that, in any event, the 
language of the "Joinder of Spouse" document should be 
dispositive of any claim that this last-acquired 50% share is 
marital property. We do not agree with Mr. Phillips. 
Our initial consideration is whether the stock was acquired 
during marriage. Virtually all of the stock was acquired 
during the twenty-year marriage. The business corporation was 
organized the same year the parties were married. The lower 
court found that 100% of the assets (stock) was gifted to Mr. 
Phillips by his parents. That finding is clearly in error. 
The parties agree that 50% was acquired from Mark Phillips, not 
from the brothers' parents. Further, Mark's 50% was not 
acquired by gift; consideration for the insurance policy was 
paid by Mr. Phillips himself, not by a donor. In any event, 
Mr. Phillips acquired his brother's 50% during the marriage. 
Thus, it was not premarital property. 
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Insofar as the stock purchased from his brother is 
concerned, Mr, Phillips did not show it was owned by him prior 
to marriage, or that he acquired it by gift or inheritance 
during the marriage or with gifted or inherited funds. See 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)• Only his 
first 50% interest was obtained from his parents by gift. As 
to the gifting of that portion, the finding of the lower court 
is affirmed. The joinder document signed by Mrs. Phillips 
relates only to that stock acquired by him before marriage or 
by gift during marriage. The legality of the document is not 
at issue and we need not consider its validity. Moreover, it 
only relates to the separately owned stock acquired up to that 
time or to income from that stock (interest or dividends) or 
gain from that stock (appreciation in value). The remainder of 
the stock acquired from his brother by virtue of their buy-sell 
agreement was neither income nor gain from his prior holdings. 
This is not a case like Preston.1 which involved appreciation 
in value of a premarital asset of the husband and property 
inherited by the wife, nor is it like Burke,2 which involved 
appreciation in value of the wife's inherited property.3 
On the other hand, this is a case like Wagner v. Wagner, 4 
Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407, 409-11 (1987). There, a father 
gave each of his children an option to acquire an interest in a 
shopping center. Each of the children exercised the option and 
delivered promissory notes to their father in payment of the 
purchase price. Later, the father forgave payment of the notes 
as gifts to his children. Thereafter, one of his married 
daughters became involved in a divorce action. She contended 
the entire transaction was a gift and that her shopping center 
ownership was her separate property. The husband contended 
that, when she acquired the interest, she did so with a loan 
from her father. Thus, he argued that the transaction was a 
purchase, not a gift, and that the forgiving of the note was 
irrelevant. The court agreed that the transaction was a 
1. Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982). 
2. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). 
3. The trial court and the parties mistakenly characterized 
the property issue as appreciation in value after inheritance 
or gift. Their concern was whether either party had done work 
or made contributions adding value to the stock gifted by Mr. 
Phillips• parents. 
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purchase on the date it occurred and the character thereof 
could not be altered by later action. 
Here, the Phillips brothers' stock transaction was pursuant 
to an arm's-length buy-sell agreement. The fact that Mr. 
Phillips utilized insurance proceeds from a policy he purchased 
to fund the full purchase price of his brother's stock did not 
change the transaction to one of gift or inheritance. Nor 
would the character of the transaction be other than purchase 
if funded part by insurance proceeds and part by notes, as 
their buy-sell agreement contemplated, or if funded by 
borrowing from a third party, or by some other fortuitous 
event, such as a lottery. The stock was acquired during 
marriage by purchase and is marital property. See In re 
Marriage of Aaazim, 147 111. App. 3d 646, 498 N.E.2d 742 (1986) 
(transfer of apartment building to wife from wife's father was 
sale rather than nonmarital gift, agreement transferring 
buildings was contract of sale); Giedinghagen v. Giedinohaaen, 
712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (wife's lottery winnings 
were marital property, subject to equitable distribution). 
In summary, Mr. Phillips did not acquire his brother's 
stock prior to marriage. It was not separate as premarital 
property. His brother's share was not received by Mr. Phillips 
from anyone as an heir or devisee. Thus, it was not separate 
as inherited property. The share was not received by Mr. 
Phillips from a donor as donee and was not purchased with funds 
that were gifted to him by a donor. Thus, it was not separate 
as gifted property. Mr. Phillips was a buyer who purchased the 
stock from a seller pursuant to a written contract of sale. 
Thus, the stock is marital property because acquired by 
purchase during marriage. The funding arrangement did not 
alter the nature of the property acquired.4 
The parties requested, as being equitable, an equal 
4. In his brief, Mr. Phillips argues that "the evidence shows 
that plaintiff had received these assets through gifts and 
inheritance from his family." He did not argue that the 
insurance proceeds were his separate property on any 
rationale. If he had shown that the insurance premiums were 
paid with advances of his separate property, he might have 
recovered the amount thus paid, but not the proceeds of the 
insurance policy. See, e.g., Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 
(Utah 1982) (husband credited with $9,310.93 advanced on 
cabin); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) (wife 
reimbursed $3,400 advanced as down payment on family home). 
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distribution of their marital property. The lower court 
honored their requests concerning the property distributed. 
Thus, Mrs. Phillips is entitled to one-fourth of the Phillips 
Investment Trust (one-half of 50%) as valued on the date of 
divorce, together with a pro rata share of income/loss and 
appreciation/depreciation accrued thereon. 
We reverse and remand for a property award consistent with 
this opinion. 
ALIMONY AWARD 
Finally, we turn to the alimony award of $1,000 per month 
for ten years. Mrs. Phillips1 principal assertion concerning 
alimony is that the trial court failed to make findings on two 
of the three alimony factors stated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). We agree with this contention. The 
trial court found that Mr. Phillips had ability to provide 
support from his income of $5,000 per month. There is no 
finding concerning Mrs. Phillips' needs. Her exhibit showed 
monthly living expenses of $1,000. He did not challenge that 
amount. He claims she only asked for $1,000 alimony, but her 
request was made in tandem with a request for $156,584 in 
property distribution. She received only $71,000 in property. 
The court did make the following finding relating to the factor 
of her ability to support herself: 
Defendant has received post high school 
training and earned a certificate in 
medical technology. Defendant has not 
used this certificate in many years and 
has been employed only in a few minor 
jobs; during most of defendant's marriage 
to plaintiff, she has been a full time 
homemaker and not employed outside the 
home. Defendant has basically good 
health, is intelligent, and is capable of 
employment. Defendant has no current 
source of income and is entitled to an 
award of alimony. 
There is no finding concerning her earning capacity, which 
would provide a baseline for modification purposes. See Hialey 
v. Hiolev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 & n.l (Utah 1983); Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We are 
unable to review the adequacy of the findings to support the 
870579-CA 6 
conclusion that Mplaintiff should pay to decedent the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month,H nor do we see any evidence or finding 
supporting or relevant to the conclusion that alimony should 
continue for a period of only ten years and not be permanent. 
Nothing in the record indicates any particular significance of 
that period of time. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for additional findings 
concerning: (1) Mrs. Phillips' needs;5 (2) her ability to 
provide for herself, including an earning capacity baseline; 
(3) elimination of the ten-year cap on alimony; (4) a separate 
finding concerning income which will flow to both parties from 
the assets awarded them; and (5) an alimony award consistent 
with those findings. See Johnson v. Johnson, 103 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 22 (Ct. App. March 8, 1989). 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
•o * D ,4 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1>VJ** 
5. Mrs. Phillips testified that she needed, in addition to her 
monthly living expenses, income for employment training and 
rehabilitation so she could provide for herself. Apparently, 
she expected to provide for her rehabilitation through income 
from a larger property award, which she did not receive. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS, : Civil No. 98183 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial on October 23, 1987 before the Honorable David E. 
Roth, judge of the above entitled court. Plaintiff was both 
personally present and represented by his attorney Jane A. 
Marquardt. Defendant was present and represented by her 
attorney Robert L. Neeley. Upon hearing sworn testimony 
from the parties and witnesses, and after receiving into 
evidence various written exhibits, and hearing arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, the court 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant maintained a matrimo-
as 
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Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
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nial domicile in Weber County, State of Utah, and defendant 
was a resident of Weber County for more than three months 
immediately preceding the filing of this divorce complaint. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married on October 6, 1967 in Alta, Utah. Both 
plaintiff and defendant are presently 45 years of age. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, one of whom is still a minor, to wit: Christopher 
John Phillips, born November 11, 1970. 
4. During the marriage, the parties have experi-
enced various problems and they have now been separated for 
approximately one year and both parties are entitled to be 
granted a decree of divorce on the basis of irreconcilable 
differences. 
5. Plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant 
should be awarded custody of the minor child, subject to 
plaintiff's reasonable rights of visitation. 
6. Plaintiff is a full time employee of the United 
States Forest Service and has received a gross monthly sal-
ary of $3,155.00. He also has the right to receive income 
from Phillips Investment Trust. Over the past five years, 
the amount of income available to plaintiff from Phillips 
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Investments has averaged $25,000.00 per year and the court 
finds that plaintiff will continue to receive approximately 
this amount of money from Phillips Investments. The court 
finds that plaintiff's income will continue at close to this 
rate despite the fact that the major income of Phillips 
Investments, payments from the Hamilton/Holman promissory 
note, will cease after 1990. The court believes that the 
assets of the trust are worth approximately $260,000.00 and 
will continue to generate at least $21,000.00 per year in 
income to plaintiff. 
7. The court believes it is reasonable to set 
plaintiff's child support and alimony responsibilities on an 
expected total monthly gross income of $5,000.00. This fig-
ure includes $3,155.00 per month from plaintiff's employment 
with the forest service and $l,750.00-$2,08 3.00 per month 
from Phillips Investments. 
8. Defendant has received post high school train-
ing and earned a certificate in medical technology. 
Defendant has not used this certificate in many years and 
has been employed only in a few minor jobs; during most of 
defendant's marriage to plaintiff, she has been a full time 
homemaker and not employed outside the home. Defendant has 
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basically good health, is intelligent, and is capable of 
employment. Defendant has no current source of income and 
is entitled to an award of alimony. 
9. Defendant is entitled to alimony in the amount 
of $1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and con-
tinuing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death 
of plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, 
or upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever 
event occurs first. 
10. Defendant is entitled to child support in the 
amount of $622.00 per month, the same to be paid until the 
child, Christopher, graduates from high school, assuming he 
graduates on schedule with his class. 
11. Plaintiff is the owner of assets worth approxi-
mately $260,000.00 which are now in the entity known as the 
Phillips Investments Trust. These assets were gifted to 
plaintiff by his parents over a period of many years. 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant have done any significant 
work in the business which made up Phillips Investments, nor 
have either of them made any contributions to the value of 
the assets in Phillips Investments. The assets of Phillips 
Investments are plaintiff's separate property and defendant 
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has no claim to this property. The fact that plaintiff does 
have the resources of Phillips Investments available to him 
is relevant only to his ability to pay child support and 
alimony. 
12. The parties have accumulated various assets in 
the marriage, valued as follows: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
i. 
J . 
k. 
1. 
Equity in Riverdale, Utah home 
Hoback, Wyoming property 
Victor Estates 
Plaintiff's retirement 
Plaintiff and defendant IRAs 
Weber Valley Bank savings 
Moore Financial stock 
Ketchum bank account 
1986 Volkswagon automobile 
1981 Honda automobile 
Furniture and household contents in 
defendant's possession 
Furniture, sporting equipment and 
$ 29,000, 
45,000. 
4,500, 
29,000, 
14,528, 
1,600, 
648, 
300, 
6,800, 
2,000, 
6,500, 
1,000, 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
personal effects in plaintiff1s poss. 
13. The parties have incurred various debts, 
including a mortgage on the Riverdale home owing to Fleet 
Mortgage in the approximate amount of $47,000.00, a bill 
owing to Sears in the amount of $335.00, and $600.00 owing 
to Rose Bourgeois for money loaned on the Hoback property. 
14. Plaintiff is employed by the United States 
Forest Service and has health insurance coverage through his 
employer. Pursuant to the terms of the federal law known as 
C.O.B.R.A., defendant is eligible to enroll for continued 
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insurance coverage as the ex-spouse of a covered employee. 
14. Each party has retained an attorney to repre-
sent them in this action and has agreed to pay a reasonable 
amount for attorney fees. 
From the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That both parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other party herein, the same to become 
final upon signing by the judge and filing with the clerk of 
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. That the sole care, custody and control of the 
parties1 minor child, to-wit: Christopher John Phillips be 
awarded to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visi-
tation in the plaintiff. 
3. That the plaintiff should pay to the defendant, 
as and for child support, the sum of $622.00 per month, and 
shall make such payments until said child attains majority 
or the child's regular high school class graduates, which-
ever occurs later. 
4. That alimony should be awarded upon the follow-
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
Page 7 
ing terms: plaintiff should pay to defendant the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continu-
ing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death of 
plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, or 
upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever 
event occurs first. 
5. One-half of plaintiff's monthly child support 
and alimony payment, or $811.00, shall be paid directly to 
defendant by the 1st day of each month and one-half shall be 
paid directly to defendant by the 15th day of each month. 
6. That the child support Order should include, as 
a means of collecting child support, a provision for with-
holding income pursuant to Sections 78-45d-l et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant shall alternate claim-
ing the minor child as a dependent on their tax returns with 
plaintiff being entitled to claim him in 1987, defendant in 
1988, and so on. Plaintiff must be current on his child 
support payments to claim the child as a dependent on his 
tax return. Defendant is required to sign the necessary 
forms with the Internal Revenue Service which indicate that 
plaintiff is entitled to claim the child as a deduction 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No, 98183 
Page 8 
in the appropriate years. 
8, Plaintiff shall assist defendant in enrolling 
for continued health insurance coverage through the 
C.O.B.R.A. regulations and defendant shall be responsible 
for paying the premiums for this coverage. 
9. Plaintiff should continue carrying medical and 
dental insurance on the minor child, providing it remains 
available through his place of employment. Any medical or 
dental bills of the child which are not covered by insurance 
should be split between the parties, with each party having 
the responsibility of paying one-half of any uncovered 
medical or dental costs. 
10. That each party is awarded his or her own per-
sonal property already in their possession. 
11. Plaintiff should be awarded the following items 
of property: 
a. His federal retirement, free of any $ 29,000.00 
claim of the defendant 
b. Furniture, sporting equipment and 1,000.00 
personal effects in plaintiff!s poss. 
c. 1986 Volkswagon automobile 6,800.00 
d. Ketchum bank account 300.00 
e. Hoback property 45,000.00 
f. Plaintiff's IRA 11,952.00 
TOTAL $ 94,052.00 
12. Defendant is awarded the following items of 
property: 
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a. Riverdale home located at $ 29,000.00 
3985 South 700 West, subject to 
mortgage thereon 
b. Furniture and household contents 6,500.00 
in defendant's possession 
c. 1981 Honda automobile 2,000.00 
d. Defendant's IRA 2,57 6.00 
e. Weber Valley Bank savings 1,600.00 
f. Moore Financial stock 648.00 
g. Victor Estates 4,500.00 
TOTAL $ 46,824.00 
13. In order to equalize the above property 
distribution, plaintiff shall pay to defendant: 
(a) the sum of $12,000.00 cash, the same to be 
paid within ninety (90) days, or on or before January 21, 
1988. 
(b) Pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties, plaintiff shall pay to defendant an additional sum 
of $12,000.00 in order to compensate her for plaintiff's 
IRA. This sum shall be paid within two (2) weeks of the 
entry of this Decree of Divorce. 
14. The assets of Phillips Investments Trust are 
plaintiff's sole and separate property and defendant has no 
claim thereon. 
15. Defendant is entitled to all antiques which 
were given to her by her family, free and clear of any claim 
by plaintiff. 
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16. Defendant shall pay the mortgage on the 
Riverdale home to Fleet Mortgage and hold plaintiff harmless 
thereon, together with any other debts or obligations she 
may have in her own name. 
17. Plaintiff shall pay the Sears bill in the 
approximate amount of $3 35.00, the debt owing to Rose 
Bourgeois in the amount of $600.00, together with any other 
debts or obligations he may have in his own name and hold 
defendant harmless thereon. 
18. Plaintiff shall pay to defendant's attorney, 
Robert L. Neeley, the sum of $1,000.00 as partial payment of 
defendant's attorney fees. 
20• Let Judgment and Decree be entered in accor-
dance herewith. 
DATED this /if day of ///^^f^ 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
IV-IETE". "ROTH ~ 
•-District Court Judge 
?ERT L. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
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JANE A. MARQUARDT 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 2085 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 98183 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial on October 23, 1987 before the Honorable David E. 
Roth, judge of the above entitled court. Plaintiff was both 
personally present and represented by his attorney Jane A. 
Marquardt. Defendant was present and represented by her 
attorney Robert L. Neeley. Upon hearing sworn testimony 
from the parties and witnesses, after receiving into evi-
dence various written exhibits, hearing arguments of 
counsel, being fully advised in the matter, and having 
already made and entered, separately and in writing, its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having therein 
directed entry of Judgment and Decree in accordance 
Phillips v. Phillips 
Civil No. 98183 
Page 2 
therewith. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. That both parties are awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other party herein, the same to become 
final upon signing by the judge and filing with the clerk of 
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. That the sole care, custody and control of the 
parties1 minor child, to-wit: Christopher John Phillips, be 
awarded to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visi-
tation in the plaintiff. 
3. That the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant, 
as and for child support, the sum of $622.00 per month, and 
shall make such payments until said child attains majority 
or the child's regular high school class graduates, which-
ever occurs later. 
4. That alimony is awarded upon the following 
terms: plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continu-
ing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death of 
plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, or 
Recorded Qrs 
Page 
Indexed 
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Recorded BookL 4 1 
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upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever 
event occurs first. 
5. One half of plaintiff's monthly child support 
and alimony payment, or $811.00, shall be paid directly to 
defendant by the 1st day of each month and one-half shall be 
paid directly to defendant by the 15th day of each month. 
6. That the child support Order shall include, as 
a means of collecting child support, a provision for with-
holding income pursuant to Sections 78-45d-l et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant shall alternate claim-
ing the minor child as a dependent on their tax returns with 
plaintiff being entitled to claim him in 1987, defendant in 
1988, and so on. Plaintiff must be current on his child 
support payments to claim the child as a dependent on his 
tax return. Defendant is required to sign the necessary 
forms with the Internal Revenue Service which indicate that 
plaintiff is entitled to claim the child as a deduction 
in the appropriate years. 
8. Plaintiff shall assist defendant in enrolling 
for continued health insurance coverage through the 
C.O.B.R.A. regulations and defendant shall be responsible 
Recorded Bockl 4 i 
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for paying the premiums for this coverage. 
9. Plaintiff shall continue carrying medical and 
dental insurance on the minor child, providing it remains 
available through his place of employment. Any medical or 
dental bills of the child which are not covered by insurance 
shall be split between the parties, with each party having 
the responsibility of paying one-half of any uncovered medi-
cal or dental costs. 
10. That each party is awarded his or her own per-
sonal property already in their possession. 
11. Plaintiff is awarded the following items of 
property: 
a. His federal retirement, free of any $ 29,000.00 
claim of the defendant 
b. Furniture, sporting equipment and 1,000.00 
personal effects in plaintiff's poss. 
c. 1986 Volkswagon automobile 6,800.00 
d. Ketchum bank account 300.00 
e. Hoback property 45,000.00 
f. Plaintiff's IRA 11,952.00 
TOTAL $ 94,052.00 
12. Defendant is awarded the following items of 
property: 
a. Riverdale home located at $ 29,000.00 
3985 South 700 West, subject to 
mortgage thereon 
b. Furniture and household contents 6,500.00 
in defendant's possession 
c. 1981 Honda automobile 2,000.00 
d. Defendant's IRA 2,57 6.00 
Phillips v. Phillips 
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e. Weber Valley Bank savings 1,600.00 
f. Moore Financial stock 648.00 
g. Victor Estates 4,500.00 
TOTAL $ 46,824.00 
13. In order to equalize the above property 
distribution, plaintiff shall pay to defendant: 
(a) the sum of $12,000.00 cash, the same to be 
paid within ninety (90) days, or on or before January 21, 
1988. 
(b) an additional sum of $12,000.00 in order 
to compensate her for plaintiff's IRA, the same to be paid 
within two (2) weeks of the entry of this Decree of Divorce. 
14. The assets of Phillips Investments Trust are 
plaintiff's sole and separate property and defendant has no 
claim thereon. 
15. Defendant is entitled to all antiques which 
were given to her by her family, free and clear of any claim 
by plaintiff. 
16. Defendant shall pay the mortgage on the 
Riverdale home to Fleet Mortgage and hold plaintiff harmless 
thereon, together with any other debts or obligations she 
may have in her own name. 
17. Plaintiff shall pay the Sears bill in the 
Recorded BcolJ 4 1 | 
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approximate amount of $3 35.00, the debt owing to Rose 
Bourgeois in the amount of $600.00, together with any other 
debts or obligations he may have in his own name and hold 
defendant harmless thereon. 
18. Plaintiff shall pay to defendants attorney, 
Robert L. Neeley, the sum of $1,000.00 as partial payment of 
defendant's attorney fees. 
19. That each of the parties shall execute and 
deliver to the other party any deeds, stock certificates, 
insurance policies, assignments, and any other documents or 
instruments as may be necessary to release the claim of the 
other in their respective real and personal properties as 
now held in the possession of each of the parties. Each 
party has entered his or her appearance before this Court 
and this Court hereby assumes continuing jurisdiction and 
authority to enter such Orders as may be necessary or appro-
priate to accomplish the purposes of this paragraph 
DATED this /£ day of_ , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
E. ROTH 
D i s t r i c t Cour t J u d g e 
JBERT L. NEELEY 
a t t o r n e y f o r Defendant 
JOINDER OF SPOUSE 
KATHY A. PJIILLIPS, the wife of SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, hereby states and 
acknowledges that the partnership interest in PHILLIPS INVESTMENTS owned by 
her husband, Scott H. Phillips, was entirely derived from the receipt of 
property distributed to her Iiusband from the liquidation of Phillips 
Investment to., the stock of which was acquired by her husband prior to their 
marriage or by gift during their mamap*? ann therefore, is his sole and 
separate property in which she claims no IHLCICSC, community or otherwise; 
and it is further agreed that all income and gain from such separate property 
shall be the sole and separate property of said husband. 
KATHY A. PHILLIPS further states and acknowledges that she has read 
the foregoing General Partnership Agreement and understands the provisions 
thereof and in consideration of the execution of said Agreement by the 
Partners, hereby agrees to be fully bound and controlled by the terms of said 
Agreement; and, further, that upon the death of her husband she shall execute 
any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement and/or to accomplish the transfer of all stock owned by her husband 
to the surviving Partner, pursuant to the terms of said Agreement. 
DATED: J|,is (2& day o{ J ^ \ , 1983. 
alhy A. Phillips ^ K  
STATE OF UTAH 
_unty of UXXgy ) 
On this (ZjL day of I ^M&U l f e before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said fitate, personally appeared KATHY 
PHILLIPS, known by me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument^ and acknowledged to me tha>^ sTie el^cuted the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have h 
official seal the day and year in this c/er 
? hand and afixreC my 
above written. 
blic JL/I snd ioit the St 
idmg at CxTctek 1/T 
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Exhibit E 
At Tr. p.22, lines 8-12, Frances Phillips states 
that she and her husband gifted money to her two sons (Scott 
and Mark) each year. 
And that money from the gift that we gave 
to the boys was used to pay the premiums 
on the—those life insurance policies• 
At Tr. p. 32, lines 24 & 25 and p. 33, lines 1-12, 
Frances Phillips testified that Phillips Investments had an 
insurance account and that Scott had been able to use that 
in order to acquire his brother Mark's interest. 
Q. Now, Scott didn't have to give 
up anything personally because 
fortunately there was this insurance 
policy? 
A. That's why it had been set up 
that way. 
Tr. p.33, lines 10-12. 
At Tr. p.40, lines 7-13, Mr. Hugh Phillips testi-
fied that he and his wife had given yearly gifts to their 
sons so they could pay the insurance premiums. 
Q. Were you also in addition to the 
shares of stock, giving your sons cash in 
order to pay premiums on life insurance 
policies? 
A. Mrs. Phillips and I, from our 
personal checking account, our personal 
assets, we made a gift to our two sons 
every year so they could pay for the pre-
miums of life insurance on Mrs. Phillips, 
on Mark and on Scott. 
At Tr. p.46, lines 23-35 and p.47, lines 1-3, Mr. 
Hugh Phillips verifies that Scott Phillips never put any of 
his personal assets into Phillips Investments. 
-1-
Q. Do you ever recall at any time, 
either while it was Phillips Investment 
Corporation or all the way up to now with 
it being Phillips Investment Trust, Scott 
Phillips taking any assets that he had 
acquired through his employment and put-
ting it into Phillips Investment? 
A. No, he did not. 
No exception was made to that statement to state that Scott 
somehow had used his own funds to purchase the insurance 
premiums. 
At Tr. p.69, lines 20-25, and p.70, lines 1-6, 
Scott Phillips also testified that the insurance premiums 
were paid from monies that were gifted to him and his 
brother by his parents. Scott was discussing the fact that 
he had received $12,000.00 from the Phillips Investment 
funds and had used it as a down payment on a family home 
(that payment thus became part of the marital estate). 
Scott explained that he had had to ask his brother Mark for 
the money and that Mark was the one who determined whether 
or not there was any such money to use. 
A. (Scott Phillips1 testimony)... 
Mark said, Scott, there is some left over 
money here from the gifting program from 
our parents after the insurance premiums 
were paid that would be available to you. 
At Tr. p.140, lines 20-23, Mrs. Kathy Phillips also 
verifies that she and her husband did not put any money into 
Phillips Investments. 
Q. And you and Scott never took 
your own property or things that you 
bought from his Forest Service salary and 
put it into Phillips Investment, did you? 
-2-
A. NO. 
Certainly there was no testimony from Kathy Phillips that 
Scott had been paying insurance premiums out of their mari-
tal property. 
-3-
